ty -jour a2 -ragusa，玛丽亚·亚历山德拉（Maria Alessandra au -cao -cao -cao，xiaoyong au -yang，yunxia au -yang au -yang，yuntao au -li- li -li，siru py -20222 da -2022/10/31 ti-平衡和福利分析 - 在第二票价分析中with Resale and Costly Entry SP - 9220681 VL - 2022 AB - This study investigates the effects of resale allowance on entry strategies, seller’s expected revenue, and social welfare in a second-price auction with two-dimensional private information on values and participation costs. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in cutoff strategies and identify sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Our analysis suggests that resale allowance leads the low-value bidder to become more aggressive on entry, while high-value bidder has a lower incentive to enter. Furthermore, the allowance of resale can increase the social welfare under a sufficient condition, and its effect on expected revenue is ambiguous. SN - 1026-0226 UR - https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/9220681 DO - 10.1155/2022/9220681 JF - Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society PB - Hindawi KW - ER -